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Left: A portrait of the meeting in Potsdam 1709 with Augustus the Strong
of Saxony, Frederick I of Prussia and Frederick IV of Denmark-Norway. Right:
A posthumous portrait of Peter the Great of Russia.
The anti-Swedish coalition got a disastrous start in 1700
with each member failing to achieve their objective and one of them
defecting from the war, a second suffered a crushing defeat and the third
member expressing a desire to negotiate for peace. It certainly appeared to
outsiders that the war would be a short one and thus the great powers
offered both mediation and propositions to recruit the belligerent countries
as allies in the coming War of the Spanish Succession. However, despite the
rocky start the coalition would remain in place with two members actively
fighting the war and the third one promising to re-join the war at an
appropriate time. Even the treaty of Altranstädt in 1706, which left Russia
alone in the war, did not permanently end the coalition since both Denmark
and Saxony began negotiations to re-enter the war after the Swedish army
left Saxony in 1707. In 1709 the anti-Swedish coalition of 1699 was fully
restored and this time it was more lasting.
Denmark
Denmark had been forced out of the war after the Maritime
powers helped the Swedes to land an army in the poorly defended Sealand and
thus threatened Copenhagen. The treaties which the Danes had signed with
Saxony and Russia had forbidden any member to sign peace with Sweden
separately, but the Danes claimed that they had not violated those terms.
The peace at Traventhal was technically only between Denmark and
Holstein-Gottorp since Denmark and Sweden had technically not been at war.
The Swedes together with the Maritime powers had only acted as guarantors of
the Altona treaty from 1689 and were not officially considered as
belligerent parties of the conflict. The Danes thus reassured their allies
that the Traventhal peace was in no way a defection from the coalition and
that they would soon start a proper war against Sweden.
Actually the Danes first planned to attack the Swedes
already in August 1700 by sending out the Danish navy against the weaker
Swedish naval squadron outside Sealand and thus isolate the Swedish army
still on Danish soil. The Maritime powers thwarted this plan however by
prolonging the presence of their navy in order to protect the Swedish
evacuation.
Later in the year the outcome of the battle of Narva gave
the Danes cold feet and they became unsure whether their allies were
committed to remain in the war. So they chose to wait and see before they
decided to enter the war. The battles of Düna and Kliszow had the same
effect and once the Swedish army was firmly established in Poland the Danes
became very afraid of starting a new war without Prussia as an additional
ally. The Danes were haunted by the memories of 1643-45 and 1657-58. So
long the Swedish army was within striking distance from Denmark’s southern
border, the Danes had good reason to believe that Charles XII would give a
Danish war top priority and drop everything else. Therefore they desperately
wanted Prussia to join the war and act as a shield against the Swedish main
army. Failing that they just had to wait until the Swedish army marched back
to the east again.
Russia
There was an agreement between the allies that Peter I
would not join the war until he had ended his conflict with the Ottoman
Empire. But with the intervention of the Maritime powers the Danes began to
desperately plead to the Russians to hurry up and attack Sweden or otherwise
Denmark would be forced to abandon the war. Alarmed of this Peter I decided
to rush through the peace negotiations and settle for less than desired
terms. But when he then invaded Sweden, Peter I became infuriated when he
learned that the Danes had signed the peace of Traventhal. The Saxons did
not behave much better when they shortly after the Russian invasion decided
to end this year’s campaign season. That made it an easy decision for the
Swedes to concentrate their forces against the Russians who were inflicted a
devastating defeat at Narva. Peter I blamed his allies for this and he made
his great anger known to the Danish envoy in December 1700 who felt the
atmosphere at the unpolished Russian court so hostile that he feared for his
personal safety. The Dane could however report back to Copenhagen that there
were no signs of defeatism during his meeting with the tsar. Peter I’s mind
was fully preoccupied with the next campaign season and his desire to exact
revenge for the battle of Narva.
But to continue the war Russia still needed allies and
his last one appeared to have second thoughts. That put Russia at a
disadvantage when Peter I and Augustus met at Birsen in February 1701 to
renew their alliance. Augustus managed to secure favourable terms such as a
Russian auxiliary corps of 15 to 20 000 men, a subsidy of 200 000
reichsthaler to be paid every year for two years and the promise that he
would get Livonia and Estonia if the war was successful. This effectively
made Russia the junior partner of the coalition since the absence of the
auxiliaries sent to Saxony meant that Russia would not be able to carry out
any large scale offensive of their own.
Nevertheless, the campaign season of 1701 did not go much
better than the preceding year. The Saxons were defeated at Düna and they
blamed this on the Russian auxiliary corps which had refused to assist them
in the battle. The Russians on the other hand felt that they had yet again
been betrayed by the Saxons when they abandoned Courland and left the
Russian corps alone with the Swedes.
As the war dragged on more treaties would be signed
between Saxony and Russia with similar results, both parties accusing the
other for not honouring their commitments. The once so good relationship
between Augustus and Peter I deteriorated and was substituted with
animosity. The idea of signing a separate peace with Sweden thus became very
tempting for Peter I. His demands were however completely unacceptable for
Sweden.
Peter I conquered the mouth of the Neva River in 1702 and
quickly began construction of his great dream, the port city of Saint
Petersburg. Making Russia into a naval power was an obsession of his and he
would never settle for anything less than keeping the area around the Neva
River and the island of present day Kronstadt, no matter how badly the war
went. Preferably he wanted all of Ingria and Carelia as well, but during the
darker moments of the war he was willing to settle for the smaller territory
and even compensate Sweden by ceding Russian territory in return for that
area. Although, after the great rebellions against his rule in 1705 he no
longer dared to cede any Russian land and instead proposed Polish territory
as compensation.
Sweden could however not allow Russia to gain access to
the Baltic Sea and build a navy since that would fatally undermine the
Swedish realm. Sweden had long coasts and scattered provinces which made
naval control of the Baltic Sea absolutely essential for the survival of
their empire. But since the Danish and Swedish navies were evenly matched a
newly created Russian navy would put the Swedes at a serious disadvantage.
The Swedish demands were instead that Russia returned all
occupied territories and offered compensation for the damage it had done to
Sweden. The compensation should preferably be in the form of Russian
territory but Charles XII appeared to be open to other alternatives when
Prussia offered to mediate in 1705. This mediation would however go nowhere
since Peter I was completely unwilling to give up his beloved Saint
Petersburg. The next year after the battle of Fraustadt the Prussians tried
again, this time desperately trying to convince Peter I to be reasonable
since they feared a continued war would result in total Swedish domination
of North-eastern Europe. But to no avail, Peter I was determined to keep his
Baltic port. In 1707-08, through English channels, he proposed a peace with
Sweden on the terms that he was to keep the area around Saint Petersburg
permanently and also Narva for some years. At the time these were totally
unreasonable terms and Sweden and Russia had to settle their differences on
the battle field.
Saxony
The weak link of the coalition was the untrustworthy
Augustus. He was the ultimate opportunist who would stop at nothing to
further his great ambitions. He had no loyalty to anyone but himself and
deceived friends and foes alike. This behaviour may have given him short
term advantages but it hurt him in the long term since his character flaws
soon became widely known. This resulted in Charles XII refusing to engage in
negotiations with him on the count that any treaty signed by him was not
worth the paper it was written on. Likewise, potential allies such as
Denmark and Prussia hesitated to join the war because they feared Augustus
might just use that to make a quick peace with Charles XII and possibly even
switch side.
Augustus’ diplomacy was very active and often
contradictory throughout the war, thus making it difficult to record all of
it here. But it is worthwhile to note that his ambitions were not limited to
seizing territory from Sweden. Even though he had become king of Poland as
the anti-French candidate he soon began attempts to smooth his relations
with France and forge an alliance with them against Austria. The prospect of
a war over the Spanish succession was viewed by him as a great opportunity
to conquer Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia among other territories and then
replace the Habsburgs as Holy Roman Emperor. These negotiations occurred at
the same time as he was preparing for war against Sweden and not even his
own diplomats knew that he pursued two different strategies at the same
time. The Danish diplomats suspected it though, but Augustus denied it to
them. And when the news about the Saxon invasion in Livonia broke, Augustus
had the audacity to ask for military support from France and the other great
powers by claiming that it was the Swedes who had invaded his kingdom and
not the other way around, as well as reassuring the French of his continued
interest in an alliance against Austria.
After Denmark was forced out of the war Augustus found
his home country dangerously exposed since the Saxon army was engaged far
away in Livonia. The prospect of an imminent Swedish invasion of a
defenceless Saxony made him declare an interest in peace negotiations and
France offered to mediate. Charles XII had however by now acquired an
intense contempt of Augustus moral character and regarded it as a stalling
tactic. He was not willing to engage in any meaningless peace negotiations
with him even if it meant a risk that Sweden would be regarded as the
obstacle to peace by the great powers. The Swedish military commander in
Germany refused however to carry out an invasion of Saxony citing a lack of
preparations and unclear instructions. The Russian invasion and the arrival
of a Danish auxiliary corps in Saxony during the autumn finally closed the
window of opportunity for a Swedish invasion of Saxony in 1700.
Nevertheless, the French continued their attempt to
mediate in the hope of freeing Saxony as an ally in the coming war against
Austria, although Augustus insistence on keeping the fortress of Dünamünde
which he had conquered made peace unlikely. And whatever interest he might
have had of exiting the Great Northern War and joining a War of the Spanish
Succession instead, died when Prussia and Hanover sided with Austria. As a
French ally, Saxony would have been surrounded by enemies and rather than
making great conquests Augustus would be more likely to lose territory. But
despite of this he kept on negotiating in bad faith with France just like he
had done with Sweden before the war, always promising that just some minor
modifications were needed until he would sign the treaty. He continued with
this even after the French found out that he had agreed to send an auxiliary
corps to Austria in 1702, which he of course denied straight to their faces.
The auxiliary corps he sent to Austria gave him not just money in return but
also the very valuable permit for his troops to pass through Silesia during
the war against Sweden.
The major objective for Augustus’ diplomacy in the early
years was however to convince the Polish parliament to declare war against
Sweden. That certainly looked like a strong possibility during the first
year of the war, but he was dependant on military success to seal the deal
and that evaded him. He hoped that the Swedish invasion of Polish-Lithuanian
territory in 1701 and the guerrilla attacks on Swedish troops made by his
supporters would provoke a declaration of war from either Sweden or Poland.
But Charles XII carefully avoided the traps and calmly insisted that Poland
as a neutral power had to offer him the same benefits as they had given the
Saxon troops, and thus dismissed the Polish diplomats’ one-sided demands
that the Swedish army should return to Livonia without any efforts from the
Polish side to prevent the Saxon army from operating from Polish territory.
But while Augustus was working to convince the Poles to
join him, he also repeatedly offered Polish territories to Sweden, Prussia
and Russia in exchange for peace or military support. As always with
Augustus it is difficult to determine if these offers were sincere or just
part of his attempts to manipulate people. It is likely that the offer to
Sweden was an attempt to incriminate Sweden in the eyes of the Poles. In any
event it backfired. Charles XII did not meet the Saxon diplomat but had him
arrested in early 1702 and confiscated his instructions which were then made
known to the Poles. Augustus’ attempts to woo Prussia were likewise
undermined by the Swedes who informed the Prussians about his attempts to
entice Sweden into joining Saxony in a war against Prussia. As if all that
was not enough the Swedes also intercepted a letter containing Augustus’
offer to cede Polish territory to Russia.
With a string of military defeats and loss of credibility
Augustus quickly began to lose support among Poles who now started to listen
to the constant suggestions from Sweden to depose Augustus. The turning
point was the fall of Thorn in late 1703 and the following summer a
pro-Swedish faction elected Stanislaw Leszczynsky as Polish king and then
had him crowned in 1705. But this just resulted in a Polish civil war and it
took a Swedish invasion of Saxony in 1706 to force Augustus to agree to
Charles XII’s demands and acknowledge the loss of his Polish throne.
Sweden
 The
Swedish strategy when war broke out was to concentrate its resources against
Denmark. Charles XII wanted to deliver a decisive blow against Denmark and
settle the Holstein-Gottorp question once and for all. The Maritime Powers
however just wanted a quick end to the hostilities. A naval battle with
Denmark was avoided and instead of shipping the Swedish main army to Germany
it had to land on Sealand where it was completely dependent on the continued
presence of the Anglo-Dutch navy. The Maritime Powers then brokered a status
quo peace with Denmark which Holstein-Gottorp and Sweden had no choice but
to accept. With Denmark left unscathed Sweden would be in constant danger of
Danish intervention when the Swedish main army deployed in the East.
The Maritime Powers’ alliance with Sweden would still act
as deterrence though and they did put strong diplomatic pressure on the
Danes (and the Prussians) to keep them out of the Great Northern War. But it
was clear that they only supported Sweden when it was in their self-interest
to do so. Denmark and Prussia provided valuable troops to the allied armies
in the War of the Spanish Succession so the Maritime Powers did not want
these diverted to a war against Sweden. But the treaty they had signed with
Sweden in January 1700 stipulated that they would provide auxiliary troops
in case Sweden was attacked, something they did not deliver despite of
repeated demands from Charles XII to do so. Sweden only got a partial
economic compensation for this non-compliance of the treaty.
Since the Saxon invasion of Livonia was a violation of
the treaty of Oliva from 1660 which was guaranteed by France and Austria,
Sweden asked for military support from these countries as well but would get
nothing from them too. Sweden had to face a war on two fronts all by itself.
Charles XII’s most important strategic decision was to
neutralise the Saxon threat by deposing Augustus as king of Poland. This was
also his most controversial decision since his advisors thought it was a far
too ambitious objective considering Sweden’s limited resources. Both Charles
XII and his advisors agreed that it was a highly desired goal to gain Poland
as an ally in the war against Russia, and that this was in the best interest
of both Sweden and Poland. They also agreed that Augustus was an utterly
unreliable character who could not be trusted. But Charles XII’s advisers
thought it would be possible to strike a deal with Augustus to make peace
and maybe also convince him to switch side. Charles XII however dismissed
those suggestions as too dangerous. Sweden should not be made dependent on
the goodwill of Augustus since he would not hesitate to stab Sweden in the
back if that would benefit him. Before a large-scale invasion against Russia
could commence, Augustus had to be rendered harmless. And with a new king on
the Polish throne the road would be paved for the “natural alliance” between
Sweden and Poland.
The idea of deposing Augustus most likely matured in
Charles XII’s mind during the winter of 1700-01 and was first expressed by
him in the spring of 1701. But preparations for a campaign against the
Russian fortress in Pskov were still in progress after the battle of Düna
and it was not until the autumn of 1701 that the Swedish army started to
penetrate the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth beyond Courland.
The territorial gains Sweden hoped to achieve in the war
were Courland and possibly Polish Livonia. Poland was to be compensated for
these losses by instead regaining territories previously lost to Russia in
1667. The Poles were however not so thrilled about this proposition and
comments were made that if Poland helped Sweden to reclaim territories
currently occupied by the Russians then they would owe the Swedes nothing
for Swedish help in retrieving the territories Poland lost in 1667. Since
Charles XII wanted to avoid antagonising the Poles more than he had to, he
chose to focus on the issue of deposing Augustus and left the territorial
issue to be decided after the war in Poland had been settled.
As Poland descended into civil war between pro-Stanislaw
and pro-Augustus factions it became however clear that just deposing
Augustus was not enough to neutralise him. If Sweden was to turn against
Russia, other guarantees were needed to prevent Augustus from harming the
Swedish cause. Charles XII had hoped that the great powers would give him
that guarantee, but they were unwilling to even recognise Stanislaw as king
let alone preventing Augustus from interfering in Polish affairs. Austria in
particular was very pro-Saxon and did just about as much as they dared to
help Augustus without provoking a war against Sweden. The Maritime powers on
the other hand did what they could to prevent Denmark and Prussia from
joining Sweden’s enemies, and Sweden reciprocated this by abiding with their
request to not invade Saxony while the War of the Spanish Succession
continued. The reason to this request was that a Swedish army in Saxony
would frighten the German princes so much that these would withdraw their
auxiliary corps from the fronts and thus greatly harm the allied war effort.
But when the Maritime Powers even after the battle of Fraustadt still
refused to guarantee Stanislaw’s throne, Charles XII had no choice than to
turn back west and invade Saxony.
Prussia
Another power that could have helped Sweden to keep
Augustus away from Poland was Prussia. At the beginning of the war they were
more likely to support the anti-Swedish coalition though. But this changed
when the Swedish main army adopted the north western corner of Poland as its
base of operations in 1703. With the Swedish army in close proximity of
Prussia’s core regions, an alliance with Sweden was more preferable than a
war against them. The Prussian king Frederick I was basically just an
opportunist who was willing to side with whoever gave him the best offer.
Charles XII wanted Prussia to use its considerable
influence in Poland to help him deposing Augustus. Those Poles who sat on
the fence regarded it to be of great importance to know which side Prussia
would throw its support behind. It was also Charles XII’s hope that the
Prussian army would be deployed along the Polish border to act as a shield
against Saxon incursions and thus enable the Swedish army to leave Poland
and head for Russia instead.
Prussian support was however not cheap. Frederick I
wanted Polish Prussia, Ermland and Courland, something he claimed to be a
reasonable demand since Augustus offered him the same territories if he
would join Sweden’s enemies. He quickly dropped the Courland claim though
when he learned that the Swedes wanted to keep that province for themselves.
But his demands were still impossible for the Swedes to satisfy since he
wanted territorial gains immediately if he were to support Sweden, and that
was completely incompatible with Sweden’s painstaking efforts to gain Poland
as an ally. Swedish promises that Polish territories could be ceded once
Russia was defeated and Poland could be compensated with Russian territories
had no effect on Frederick I. Even though Prussia was willing to haggle with
their territorial demands, such as reducing it to just Elbing and a narrow
coastal strip connecting Prussian Pomerania with East Prussia, they still
insisted on gaining these territories before they did anything in return. To
make matters even worse, the support Frederick I offered was limited to just
friendly neutrality and he would not even agree to recognise Stanislaw as
king before a majority of the other European powers had done the same.
What Fredrick I offered was not worth the price he was
asking for, but the talks nevertheless continued since it was a way to
prevent Prussia from joining Sweden’s enemies. Charles XII also achieved his
first objective with his Prussian strategy by signing a treaty in 1703. The
actual treaty was not really significant by itself and it was more a first
step towards a real alliance. But Charles XII made the content of the treaty
secret which led outsiders to exaggerate its importance and that influenced
public opinion in Poland.
In reality Prussia remained indecisive throughout the
Polish campaign and switched back and forth between the two camps. Prussia
regarded the Great Northern War as a once in a century opportunity to gain
territory. And even though they considered the Anti-Swedish coalition to
have a slight advantage to win the war, the two camps were regarded as so
evenly matched that Prussia would decide the outcome regardless of which
side they picked. This meant that Prussia was in the seemingly envious
position to be able to sell their support to the highest bidder. But there
were several factors that greatly complicated this game for the Prussians.
The first factor that held Frederick I back was the fear
of having his lands ravaged by war. With the Swedish main army in north
western Poland it was highly likely that Prussia would become their primary
target if Frederick I chose to side with the anti-Swedish coalition.
Furthermore, the solidarity between the members of the anti-Swedish
coalition had proven to be weak and Frederick had great fears of the
possibility of Saxony switching side if he declared war on Sweden. And it
was not much better if he sided with Sweden since the Russian main army was
deployed in Lithuania within striking distance from East Prussia. Prussian
observers, who had been shocked by the Russian’s brutal warfare in Livonia
and also the atrocities and widespread looting in supposedly friendly
Lithuanian territory, offered grave warnings about what could happen to East
Prussia if they engaged in a war against Russia. And also the core region
of Brandenburg was dangerously exposed to Saxon attacks since most of the
Prussian army was fighting in the War of the Spanish Succession.
The second factor that held Frederick I back was the fact
that he had ambitious goals in the west too. He had hoped to succeed William
of Orange as stadtholder of the Netherlands and also inherit his widespread
domains since he was his closest male relative. But when William of Orange
died in 1702 Frederick I was disappointed to learn that he had been left out
of his will and that the Dutch had no interest in making him their
stadtholder. Nevertheless, he persisted with his claims to these
territories, and since his only leverage was the troops he supplied to the
allies in the Spanish war, this meant that pulling out of the war and
instead joining the Great Northern War would end all hopes of getting at
least some of William of Orange’s territories.
There were also financial reasons to stay out of the war
since Frederick I had greatly mismanaged Prussia’s economy. He was spending
half of the annual budget on the royal court alone in his vain attempts to
present himself as an equal to the other crowned heads in Europe. To
maintain their large army the Prussians were completely dependent on foreign
subsidies and these would be lost if Prussia withdrew its troops from the
War of the Spanish Succession. With the economy already in a poor shape, a
war would likely ruin Prussia.
Lastly there was also the fear of intervention from the
Maritime powers in case Prussia sided with the anti-Swedish coalition. The
Maritime powers certainly made such threats and the Prussians referred to
these in their negotiations with Denmark. But these threats may have merely
been used as an excuse to not take the step. The Danes got the same
treatment and were not as concerned about this, even though they too
frequently used this as an excuse in the talks with Russia and Saxony. The
Maritime powers were unlikely to intervene while the War of the Spanish
Succession was still in progress, because if they did that they would not
only lose valuable auxiliary corps but also effectively turn them into
French allies. However, if the War of the Spanish Succession would end
before the Great Northern War, then the Prussians (and the Danes) would risk
a repeat of 1679 when French intervention forced Denmark and Brandenburg to
return their conquests to Sweden.
All these concerns made Frederick I reluctant to join the
Great Northern War. What he really wanted to offer was friendly neutrality,
hoping that the mere threat of a Prussian entry in the war would make the
participants eager to overbid each other for Prussia’s friendship. He also
frequently tried to act as a mediator. A pet project of his was a compromise
peace in which the Polish commonwealth was partitioned so that Stanislaw
would get Lithuania and Augustus would get Poland proper. Frederick I pushed
this idea because he believed a partition would make it easier for him to
get a slice of Polish territory. But despite of the cautious nature of
Frederick I, his desire for territorial gains was so great that he would
join the war if the opportunity was too promising to ignore.
The first time it got close to a Prussian entry in the
war was in late 1704. Charles XII had left the vicinity of Prussia when he
headed south with his army to crack down pro-Augustus Polish forces. A Saxon
force behind his back then managed to seize Warsaw in a surprise attack.
This was Augustus first major victory and with the Russian main army in
Lithuania and Denmark eagerly waiting to join the war if Prussia did the
same, the great opportunity seemed to have arrived for Frederick I. Prussian
regiments which had recently fought in the battle of Blenheim were on their
march to East Prussia where a field army of over 18 000 men was to be
assembled. But a swift Swedish counter-offensive, resulting in the
re-conquest of Warsaw and the battle of Punitz, forced the Saxons and their
Russian auxiliary corps to seek safety in Saxony. Frederick I immediately
switched track and reassured Charles XII of his friendly intentions and that
the military build-up in East Prussia was motivated by fear of the Russians.
The second time was the winter of 1705-06 when the odds
appeared to be firmly stacked against Charles XII with large armies from
both West and East on course to squeeze the Swedish forces in Poland as well
as a sharp increase of the tension between Sweden and Denmark. Since few
Prussian troops were available at home at that time, a Prussian entry in the
war was not an immediate threat though, and the events of Fraustadt and
Grodno would completely change the picture. Sweden emerged victorious and
was now even less interested in accepting Frederick’s territorial demands.
With Saxony under Swedish occupation the Prussians feared
that Sweden had effectively won the war and they blamed themselves for
missing such a great opportunity to gain territories by waiting too long to
pick a side. In 1707 Prussia finally signed a defensive alliance with Sweden
but the contents of that treaty was a far cry from what they once had hoped
for
Charles XII at the height of
his power
The Swedish invasion of Saxony in August/September 1706
forced Augustus to sign the peace of Altranstädt and end his participation
in the war. Since the Russian army was not perceived as strong enough to
resist the Swedish army on its own, it was widely believed in Europe that
the end of the Great Northern War was near. The assumption was that a
Russian campaign would be a very short affair since the Russians would
surely come to their senses and sue for peace once their army had
unsuccessfully clashed with the Swedes. Little did they know how determined
Peter I was to keep Saint Petersburg.
With the defeat of Russia a foregone conclusion, European
observers anxiously kept their eyes on what Charles XII planned to do with
his army that was now located deep inside German territory. The Danes in
particular feared that their provocations in the previous years would be
punished with a repeat of 1643-45 and 1657-58. Among many things, Danish
ships had traded in Swedish ports that were occupied by Russia, their
diplomats had spread lies about Sweden in European courts and most
importantly Danish troops had evicted the Holstein-Gottorp ruler of the
prince bishopric of Lübeck which Denmark claimed for one of their own
princes. Terrified about the possibility of a Swedish invasion the Danes now
folded on every issue of contention and agreed to all Swedish demands.
But to a much greater extent it was Austria who felt the
pressure from Charles XII. Their assistance to Sweden’s enemies during the
Polish campaign had not gone unnoticed, their last insult being that they
allowed Russian troops in Saxony to escape to Russia through Austrian
territory. However, it was Austria’s violation of the terms of the treaty of
Westphalia by persecuting Protestants in Silesia that caught Charles XII’s
special attention. He now demanded the immediate restoration of churches and
religious rights to the Silesian Protestants. The Emperor Joseph I refused
but Charles XII persisted and with that war looked like a serious
possibility.
The Austrian troops were fully committed in the War of
the Spanish Succession and the Emperor had nothing to stop Charles XII with
if he decided to invade the Austrian hereditary lands. Furthermore, the
Emperor received no sympathy from his Protestant allies who strongly urged
him to accept the Swedish demands. Not even Sweden’s former enemies were
interested in an Austrian alliance. Denmark refused on the grounds that
Austria’s military was too weak for it to be a useful ally, and Augustus was
actually hoping to join Sweden in case of a Swedish-Austrian war. Only
Russia encouraged Austria to go to war against Sweden, but their offer of a
40-50 000 men strong auxiliary corps to aid the Austrians was deemed to be
of little value.
Isolated and with few troops to defend him, Joseph I
reluctantly accepted the Swedish demands in the second treaty of Altranstädt
in August 1707. When the pope sent an angry letter in which he complained
over the fact that a Catholic monarch had given in to religious demands from
a heretic, Joseph responded by stating that the pope should be grateful that
Charles XII had not demanded that the Emperor should convert to
Protestantism because in that case he would not have known what to do.
With the affair of the Silesian Protestants settled
Charles XII could finally march east to confront the Russians. In his year
long absence the Russians had occupied all of Poland and undermined
Stanislaw by supporting the pro-Augustus Polish forces. Even though Augustus
had officially abdicated, his faction continued to resist Stanislaw, whom
they viewed as an illegitimate Swedish puppet, and claimed that the Polish
throne was now vacant. Peter I strongly encouraged this faction to elect a
new pro-Russian king but they did not want to align themselves too closely
to Russia since Charles XII was expected to come back to Poland in which
case a reconciliation with Stanislaw’s faction might be necessary.
Augustus the Strong and Charles XII have dinner together in Altranstädt December 1706
Augustus at the lowest point
in his reign
Another complication in the Polish civil war was that
Augustus had not given up on his Polish throne and he maintained contacts
with his former supporters to encourage them to continue resisting
Stanislaw. During the Russian campaign he repeatedly promised that he would
soon intervene in Poland with Saxon troops if they just kept on fighting.
But these promises were not sincere. He also promised Peter I to capture
Charles XII while he was in Saxony and then deliver him to Russia. But he
did not do so even when Charles XII made a surprise visit to him in Dresden
without an armed escort. And even though he also ensured the Russians that
he intended to re-join the war as soon as possible, he managed to stall the
negotiations by insisting on more subsidies and more auxiliary troops than
Russia was willing to give.
The reality was that Augustus, just like everyone else,
was very sceptical of Russia’s chances to win the war. And Saxony was
effectively bankrupt after years of warfare and a long Swedish occupation so
he could not afford to gamble on a new war. But true to form, Augustus
wanted to keep all options open just in case Charles XII’s luck would
change, so he kept on negotiating in bad faith and making promises he did
not intend to keep.
However, Augustus being the man he was, an imaginative
opportunist with unbridled ambitions, meant that even in this dark period in
his reign he still pursued great projects. With his prospects in the East
looking dim he instead turned his eyes to the West. Since he was a
descendant to the 13th century ruler of Both Sicilies, Frederick
II, he laid claim to the kingdom of Naples which was a part of the Spanish
inheritance. It was this kingdom he had hoped to gain if Charles XII had
attacked Austria. Since Charles XII instead turned to Russia, Augustus
switched camp and sent auxiliary troops to the Maritime Powers in the vain
hope that they would support his claim to Naples. And if that was not enough
he also claimed the Spanish Netherlands as compensation for the Holy Roman
Empire’s failure to protect him from the Swedish invasion. These demands
were completely unrealistic, but nevertheless he made a serious effort to
convince the Great Powers that he should gain these lands. It was as if he
believed there was no limit to what he could achieve by exploiting his great
talent in manipulating people.
The tide turns
It was Denmark’s plan to join the Great Northern War
again once the Swedish main army was at a safe distance from them. But they
also needed to be reassured that Russia was actually going to continue the
war and not sue for peace in the event of a defeat, such as the battle of
Holowczyn in July 1708. The Danes also negotiated with Russia about the size
of the subsidies and auxiliary corps that Russia had to provide to gain them
as an ally. And just like in the Saxon negotiations the demands were too
high for the Russians to accept. But Denmark was not in a hurry and their
king Fredrick IV could afford himself a long Italian vacation from October
1708 to the summer of 1709 which greatly slowed down the speed in the
negotiations. Frustrated with this, Russia sent a diplomat to Venice in
January to negotiate with the king in person. The battle of Lesnaya and
Charles XII’s march south to Ukraine had offered a great opportunity for
Denmark to intervene, and the Russian diplomat proposed that the king
immediately signed an alliance so that Denmark could join the war in June.
Frederick IV refused however and still insisted on huge subsidies from
Russia if he was to enter the war.
Augustus on the other hand felt greater pressure to join
the war than Denmark. With the news of the battle of Lesnaya as well as
reports of military setbacks for Stanislaw’s forces in late 1708, the time
for action came closer in great speed. His Polish supporters threatened to
elect someone else as king if he did not make good on his promises.
Augustus’ problem however was the impoverished state of Saxony. He really
needed subsidies and auxiliary corps from Russia as well as other allies in
order to challenge the Swedish forces in Poland. This meant a lot of work
for the Saxon diplomats during the spring and summer of 1709.
In order to not provoke intervention from the Great
Powers both Denmark and Saxony would pursue the strategy of keeping the war
outside of North Germany, preferably through a formal treaty by all
participants in the war. This would also have the obvious advantage of
keeping Saxony safe from Swedish invasion as well as protecting Denmark’s
southern border. From the Swedish point of view neutrality in North Germany
was a mixed bag which would later cause a lot of friction between Charles
XII and the government in Stockholm. But in 1709 Sweden was still kept out
of the loop in these discussions and North German neutrality was primarily a
way for Sweden’s enemies to appease the Great powers. This affected the
military planning in such a way that Denmark would not attack
Holstein-Gottorp or Sweden’s German provinces when they re-entered the war
and instead invade Scania. A negative effect of North German neutrality was
however that Hanover and Prussia would be less likely to join the
Anti-Swedish coalition if Sweden’s German provinces were off limit.
Nevertheless, Augustus approached both Hanover and
Prussia in February of 1709 in the hope of gaining them as allies. Hanover
was however very much opposed to a war against Sweden and could not be
tempted with the prospect of gaining Bremen-Verden from Sweden. But Augustus
was still encouraged by the fact that they promised to remain neutral so
long Saxony did not disturb the peace in North Germany.
Prussia was on the other hand much more interested in an
anti-Swedish alliance despite the fact that Prussia had signed an alliance
with Sweden as late as 1707. They had actually begun to undermine
Stanislaw‘s rule in Poland already in December 1708 when news of the battle
of Lesnaya arrived, although they preferred that the Poles elected someone
else than Augustus as king.
In a rare moment of decisiveness Frederick I proposed to
the Saxon diplomat in April a plan that would give Scania to Denmark, Saint
Petersburg to Russia, Bremen-Verden to Hannover and Hesse, and Livonia to
Stanislaw. Poland would be divided between Prussia and Augustus so that
Prussia got Polish Prussia, Ermland and Courland. To make this happen
Prussia offered to participate in the war with 50 000 men. Frederick I
rescinded the offer just a week later though and urged the Saxons to
postpone the war. As had happened many times before, Frederick I was
conflicted between his ambitions in the West and the East. It was the
possibility that the War of the Spanish Succession was about to end soon
that discouraged Frederick I from withdrawing his troops and thus lose any
prospect of gaining territory in the West.
When it became clear that the war would not be postponed
Frederick I returned to his old attempts to gain territories by only
offering friendly neutrality in exchange. But just like before no one was
willing to pay so much for so little. Even without such outrageous demands,
Augustus was never very enthusiastic about the idea of having Prussia as an
ally. He regarded Prussia as Saxony’s greatest rival and did not want that
state to be enlarged, and certainly not through the acquisition of Polish
territory.
The need for a Prussian alliance was also greatly reduced
when the Danish king arrived from his long Italian vacation to Dresden in
late May and began serious negotiations. A Danish-Saxon offensive alliance
was then signed 28 June which would take effect if Russia joined it before
September. The September deadline was intended to force Russia to agree to
large subsidies and auxiliary corps. Prussia was also asked to join but
Frederick I would only commit to a minor treaty in July which would prevent
Swedish troops from marching through Prussian territory. The Danish-Saxon
treaty also appeased the Great powers by not only declaring support for
North German neutrality but also by promising to not withdraw any troops
from the War of the Spanish Succession.
If everything went according to the plan, Saxony would
invade Poland in September and Denmark would open two fronts in Scania and
along the Norwegian border in November. What they did not anticipate however
was the complete destruction of the Swedish main army less than two weeks
after the treaty was signed. The battle of Poltava did not just change the
balance of power between Sweden and its enemies, it also changed the balance
of power inside the re-emerging Anti-Swedish coalition in a very drastic
way.
The Restoration of the
Anti-Swedish Coalition
The news about the battle arrived in Dresden 24 July and
the Russian diplomat used this to put immense pressure on Augustus. The Tsar
would not offer more subsidies and auxiliaries than he had done previously
and Augustus had to start the war before the month of August if he wanted to
receive even that. This meant that Augustus was forced to start a war before
the tsar could ratify the treaty and he could then only rely on the goodwill
of Peter I if any subsidies at all would be sent to Saxony.
Augustus did sign the treaty on 29 July and in doing so
he agreed to immediately invade Poland with at least 10 000 men. However, a
complication was the fact that Augustus did not have 10 000 men at his
disposal. He was also not sure about the size of the forces opposing him in
Poland and there were even rumours that Charles XII was about to enter
Poland with a 50 000 men strong Tatar army under his command. Add to that
the Swedish troops in Germany and Augustus position appeared to be anything
but secure. He therefore delayed his invasion until late August and in the
meantime he tried unsuccessfully to convince Denmark to attack
Holstein-Gottorp, and Hanover to attack Bremen-Verden. It was not until the
Russians threatened to put someone else than him on the Polish throne that
he relented and on 24 August finally crossed the Polish border. His army was
however still well below 10 000 men, so he carefully avoided battle with the
Swedish forces and thus allowed them to safely evacuate Poland for Pomerania.
All this greatly angered the Russians who had also invaded Poland and hoped
to capture another Swedish field army.
In the end Augustus would not get any subsidies from
Russia and while he did reclaim his Polish throne, real power in Poland,
political as well as military, was now in Russian hands. Requests from both
Augustus and the Poles to reduce the Russian military presence were bluntly
denied. Those Poles who had opposed Stanislaw by accusing him to be a
Swedish puppet now found themselves being ruled by a Russian puppet instead.
But despite of all this friction a Russian-Saxon alliance was signed in
October which promised Livonia to Augustus. Russia would however not hand
over Livonia to Augustus when it was conquered and it was most likely never
Peter I’s intention to do so either. Livonia was merely used as an incentive
to keep Augustus allied to Russia and give military support to their
campaigns.
Russia’s hardball tactics were also used against Denmark
who now found that Russia was not willing to give any subsidies or
auxiliaries at all for them to re-enter the war. Denmark too was racing the
clock since the destruction of the Swedish main army in Ukraine meant that
most of these regiments would be restored in Sweden. If Denmark waited to
the spring of 1710 to begin the war, then they would face a fully restored
Swedish main army with a whole winter of military training behind it.
Furthermore, the Russians made the Danes believe that a Swedish-Russian
peace treaty may be concluded if they did not hurry. So the Danes too signed
a treaty with the Russians in October with none of the benefits that had
been offered to them just a half year before.
In early November the Danes invaded Scania and faced
little initial opposition. But even though Denmark had waited many years for
the right opportunity to launch this attack, their preparations were not
satisfactory. The Norwegian army was not ready to launch a diversionary
attack during the winter as originally intended, so the Swedes could
withdraw regiments from the Norwegian border to confront the Danes in Scania.
And despite of strong objections from their field commander, the Danish
government insisted that their army should advance and capture as much
territory as possible rather than attempting to seize a fortress. The flat
terrain of Scania meant that when winter came and the rivers froze to ice,
there would be no natural line of defence against the Swedish
counteroffensive. When this happened the Danish army had no choice but to
concentrate its forces and meet the Swedes in a pitched battle, which they
then lost decisively.
Had the Swedish commander Magnus Stenbock decided to
storm the city of Helsingborg, where the Danes had retreated after the
battle, then the entire Danish field army would have been destroyed and
Denmark would most likely have sued for peace, making their second attempt
just as short as the first one. Even after the successful evacuation of
their army from Helsingborg, the Danish court was still in a state of shock
and would have immediately sued for peace had the Swedes made any moves that
suggested an invasion of Sealand was imminent. Unfortunately for Sweden, the
man who recognised great opportunities like this was far away in the Ottoman
Empire. Magnus Stenbock received a promotion to field marshal by the Royal
council in Stockholm for his victory but Charles XII retracted that
promotion on the ground that he should have destroyed the Danish army by
storming Helsingborg. He also ordered the council to offer a favourable
peace to Denmark believing that the battle had made them regret their
re-entry in the war. However, it took the news nearly two month to reach
Bender where Charles XII was staying, and by the time the Swedish government
could act on his orders the Danes had already calmed down and were now
determined to continue the war. This time the Anti-Swedish coalition
remained intact after the initial setback.
The Prussian Epilogue
The potential fourth member of the coalition did not
materialise this time either since Prussia continued to waver and make
unrealistic demands. In August 1709 Frederick I heard rumours that Charles
XII had died and he ordered that Swedish-held Elbing was to be taken with
force by Prussian troops if the rumours were confirmed. But even though the
Prussian troops were well prepared and the commander reported that the task
could be done with relative ease, Frederick I insisted that Charles XII had
to be dead before he would commit to this act of war against Sweden. When it
was clear that Charles XII was still alive, Frederick I tried unsuccessfully
to convince the Swedes to hand over Elbing to Prussia before it fell to the
Russians.
Frederick I also contacted Russia and offered all kinds
of support to them, except military, in exchange for Elbing. Russia was
interested and in late September Peter I offered to give Elbing to Prussia
if they contributed with artillery pieces and ammunition to the siege.
During this time Frederick got increasingly bolder and demanded more Polish
territory from the Russians and contemplated an attack against Swedish
Pomerania. The Russians did not dismiss his territorial demands but they
wanted to wait with an agreement until Frederick I and Peter I met in person
in Marienwerder in late October. By that time Frederick’s territorial
demands now consisted of Swedish Pomerania, Polish Prussia, Ermland,
Courland and Samogitia. But amazingly enough he insisted in gaining all
these vast territories without giving anything in return except for friendly
neutrality. The Swedish army in Poland had just before the meeting evacuated
to Pomerania and this had apparently made Frederick too afraid to attack
that province. The Russians were baffled and could initially not believe
that it was even possible that the Prussians were serious with these
demands. But once they realised that these really were Prussia’s terms, the
Russians promptly rejected them and instead agreed to a treaty that was just
as meaningless as the one Prussia had signed with Denmark and Saxony in
July.
Frederick I left the meeting bitter, sad and humiliated.
He then threw a temper tantrum and blamed everyone in his surrounding for
this setback. But it was due to his own shortcomings that he had missed a
golden opportunity to enlarge Prussia. The 19th century Prussian
historian Droysen famously described Frederick’s failed foreign policy with
the phrase: “in the West: war without politic, in the East: politic without
an army”. Eventually Prussia would join the Anti-Swedish coalition and gain
territory, but that was during the reign of Frederick’s much more able son
Frederick William.
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